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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST REVEALING
MILITARY SECRETS
ROBERT F. BRACHTBNBACH.
In determining the admissibility of particular evidence, the basic
assumption is that all evidence relevant to the issues of the case is or
must be admissible unless excluded by some positive rule of law.1
One of the rules most frequently invoked to exclude evidence is that
of the privileged communication-between husband and wife, attorney
and client or physician and patient.2 In contrast, a voice claiming the
privilege to exclude evidence because it involves military secrets has
seldom been heard in the courtroom. Yet it is recognized as a genuine
testimonial privilege' of early origin.' "
In the present era of intensive military preparation-often of a
nature most secret, yet in close contact with civilian life-it is appropri-
ate to examine the scope and mechanics of the privilege. At the outset
a word of limitation is necessary. This discussion relates essentially
to the privilege related to military secrets; it does not deal with any
broad Executive privilege or immunity.5
A recent example of the operation and effect of the privilege, merit-
ing detailed examination, is United States v. Reynolds." On October 6,
1948, an Air Force bomber was engaged in testing secret electronic
equipment; aboard the plane were four civilian observers. While the
aircraft was in flight, fire broke out, leading to the subsequent crash
which killed three of the civilians. Their widows brought consolidated
suits against the United States under the Tort Claims Act.!
In the pretrial stages the plaintiffs moved for production" of the
Air Force's official accident investigation report and statements of the
three surviving crew members taken in connection therewith. The
Government moved to quash the motion, claiming that these matters
18 WXGMoRE ox EvrmNca § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
2 RCW 5.60.060.
8 8 WxGmoR., op. cit. supra note 1, § 2378 (5).
' Rex v. Watson, 2 Stark. 116 (1817).
a0'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign Im-
reunity, 21 N.C.L. Rsv. 1 (1942). Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against Production
of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1949).6345 U.S. 1 (1953).
728 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674.
8 Rule 34 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: " the court. . may (1) order
any party to produce.. any designated documents not privileged. (emphasis
supplied).
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were privileged against disclosure pursuant to Air Force regulations
issued under Revised Statutes, § 161.-
The District Court allowed the plaintiffs' motion, rejecting the claim
of privilege on the basis that the Tort Claims Act waived any privilege
based upon executive control over governmental documents." Upon a
rehearing on the earlier order, the Secretary of the Air Force filed a
"formal claim of privilege" based upon R. S. § 161, and further that the
demanded material could not be furnished "without seriously hamper-
ing national security, flying safety and the development of highly
technical and secret military equipment."
The District Court then ordered production of the matter so that it
might determine whether it was privileged matter. When the Govern-
ment declined, the court entered an order establishing the facts on the
issue of negligence in plaintiffs' favor." After a hearing to determine
damages, final judgment was entered for the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals affirmed."
In reversing the lower court,"3 the United States Supreme Court
points out that Rule 34, under which plaintiffs moved for production,
compels production only of matter "not privileged." Hence, when the
Secretary of the Air Force entered his formal claim of privilege, "he
attempted therein to invoke the privilege against revealing military
secrets, a privilege which is well established in the law of evidence."
When this privilege is asserted to exclude evidence, the problems
which arise are similar to those incident to a claim of the more common
privileges, e.g., to whom does the privilege belong? Who can claim it?
Can it be waived, and if so, by whom? How and when is it to be
invoked? How and by whom is it determined if the evidence falls
within the privileged class?
In the Reynolds opinion, the court recognizes these aspects of the
rule and provides some of the answers in light of the limited number
9 5 U.S.C. § 22: "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department... [and] the custody,
use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it."
Air Force Regulation No. 62-7(5) (b) provides: "Reports of boards of officers,
special accident reports, or extracts therefrom will not be furnished or made available
to persons outside the authorized chain of command without the specific approval of
the Secretary of the Air Force."10 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa 1950)
11 Under Rule 37 (b) (2) (i) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
12 192 F.2d 987 (C.A. 3rd 1951).
i1 Three Justices dissented "substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion
below. 192 F.2d 987."
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of United States cases," and by analogy to rules established under the
privilege against self-incrimination.
By its very nature, the privilege belongs to the Government and must
be asserted by it. An early case held that an individual cannot waive
the privilege and disclose the secret matter."5 Were the rule otherwise,
the privilege would have little force. In the words of the court:
"... parties... [would be] free to effect the disclosure of matters of
the utmost importance to the national defense and welfare, if the
possession of papers containing such information can be obtained."'"
It is a necessary corollary that the government must be permitted to
intervene in order to assert the privilege.
To invoke the privilege there must be a formal claim by the head of
the governmental department having control over the evidence in
question."8 The court, following the English rule,19 added an additional
requirement in that the head of the department must give personal
consideration to the question before the claim is presented. This
provides an additional safeguard against indiscriminate and unjustified
claims by subordinates in the department. Since a successful claim will
exclude relevant evidence, it should merit the attention of the depart-
ment head who presumably has a better grasp of the significance of
the evidence in question.
Assuming that a proper claim has been lodged, how shall it be deter-
mined if conditions exist which justify allowance of the privilege?
This problem besets the court regardless of the type of privilege
before it. Should a mere assertion of privilege operate to exclude
evidence, or should the court require complete disclosure to deter-
mine whether it will accord the claimed protection? It seems apparent
that neither of these extremes would be satisfactory, yet both were
urged in the Court of Appeals.20 Wigmore has voiced his disapproval
14 Cases in England have been more numerous. See those cited in Duncan v. Cam-
mell, Laird & Co., [19421 A.C. 624.
25Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
18 Ibid. at 355.
17 Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. N.Y. 1939).
28 In support of this rule the Reynolds opinion cites the Firth case, supra note 15,
wherein a claim had been made by the department head. Hence the case tacitly approves
this method, but does not hold it to be essential.19 Duncan case, supra note 14 at p. 638. "The essential matter is that the decision
to object should be taken by the minister who is the political head of the department,
and that he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents and himself
have formed the view that on grounds of public interest they ought not be pro-
duced..."
20 192 F2d 987, at pp. 996 and 997.
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of the theory that the evidence should not be disclosed to the court.'
The proper solution is indicated in the Reynolds opinion: "Judicial
control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice
of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the court
may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before the
claim of privilege will be accepted in any case."
Therefore, by necessity, the formula must be one of compromise.
The court must consider all the evidence, circumstances and implica-
tions of the question or request before it.22 The showing of necessity
which is made is an additional factor to be considered by the court.
However, as stated in the opinion, even the most compelling necessity
should not defeat the privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that
military secrets are involved.
In summary-The privilege against disclosing military secrets is
well established. It rests upon sound policy considerations." The
conditions which must be fulfilled before it can be successfully invoked,
coupled with the deep-rooted impartiality and integrity of our judicial
system, provide adequate safeguards against its abuse.
218 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2379, p. 799: "Is it to be said that even this
much of disclosure cannot be trusted? Shall every subordinate in the department have
access to the secret, and not the presiding officer of justice?"
22 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486-487 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L. Ed.
1118 (1951).
23 "After all, the public interest is also the interest of every subject of the realm,
and while, in these exceptional cases, the private citizen may seem to be denied what
is to his immediate advantage, he, like the rest of us, would suffer if the needs of pro-
tecting the interests of the country as a whole were not ranked as a prior obligation."
Duncan case, supra note 14, at p. 643.
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